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Theeffect of housing discrimination on the employment
opportunities of urban blacks has been the subject of
much debate since John Kain's influential article in 1968.
Kain's conclusion that the elimination of housing segregation would
produce a substantial number of additional jobs for blacks has been
challenged on several grounds: on his methodology, by the observa-
tion that there still is an adequate supply of jobs in the inner cities
despite decentralization, and by the assertion that other factors, such
as the strength of local aggregate demand and employment discrim-
ination, seem more important.'
Distinguishing the empirical effects of the various issues involved is
a complex process. By simplifying and abstracting from considera-
tions that are empirically problematical but theoretically unimpor-
tant (such as the extent of employment discrimination), however,
the model of job search in a spatial context presented here examines
the ways that constraints on blacks' residential mobility might affect
their employment situation. I do not try to determine whether or
not housing discrimination exists; that has been frequently and
extensively examined elsewhere.2 Rather, if blacks who initially live
in the inner city are victims of housing discrimination, the model
predicts, not surprisingly, that their average wageislower in
central-city jobs and higher in suburban areas than it would be in the
absence of a locational constraint. In addition, their employment will
be more concentrated near the center of the city. The impact of














housing discrimination on the duration of unemployment, however,
cannot be determined.
The analysis proceeds as follows: The urban setting is described. A
model of random, sequential job search is applied to two job hunters,
a black and a white, who begin searching from residences in the
center of the city. It is assumed that housing discrimination prevents
the black from changing his residential location. By using the
concept of stochastic dominance, implications may be drawn on the
impact of housing discrimination on black employment opportuni.
ties. These conclusions are modified when a less extreme and more
realistic version of discrimination is assumed.
THECITY
Thesetting for the model is a circular city3 much like that described
in Mills (1972). The following assumptions are made: (1) There are
two main sectors—production-employment and housing—which com-
pete for land in the city and determine locational patterns there.
(2) Some housing and some employment occur in all areas of the
city. All parcels of land the same distance from the center contain
the same economic activities. (3) Land in the very center of the city
is valued most highly because of agglomeration economies or proxim-
ity to transportation facilities. (4) If production functions permit
substitution between inputs, then because proximity to the CBD has
value, land rents as a function of distance from the CBD decline at a
decreasing rate (for proof, see Mills 1972, Chap. 5) The ratio of
capital and labor to land wifi be highest in the CBD, thereby
economizing on the scarce resource of central land; hence, employ-
ment density [D(k)] will also decline with k, the number of miles
from the CBD: D'(k)<
An equilibrium distribution of housing services occurs when no
household can increase its utility by moving. It is assumed that
households have no preference for either city or suburban living per
se. Then, since employment density decreases with distance from the
CBD, a given quantity of housing services can command a higher
price if it is nearer, rather than farther from, the CBD. People will
pay more for a location that requires lower transportation costs. This
reinforces the pattern of land rents decreasing with distance from the
center of the city, and implies that housing prices [P(k)] also will be
lower at more distant locations: P'(k) < 0.
Let the quantity of housing services (H) demanded be a function
of permanent income, price, and tastes. A person with a given
permanent income and employed at any distance k1 frsm the CBD,
In this setting, t
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suchthat k1k2, will find his utility is maximized (i.e., he lives at
an equilibrium location) if he resides at a distance k2 from the CBD,
where moving further out would increase transportation costs more
than it would save on housing expenditures, and moving further in
would increase housing costs more than it would lower commuting
costs.5 If the transportation function is linear of the form T =m+t
u, where u is the straight line distance between home and work, the
equilibrium location occurs where P'(h )2H(k2) =—t.If by chance a
person's employment is situated farther from the CBD than k2, he
would choose to live at or as near as possible to his work, since the
optimal amount of commuting for him is zero.
THESEARCH
Inthis setting, two workers, B and W, living in the center of the city
at k =0begin looking for work in occupation Z. Both employment
and vacancies occur as fixed proportions of total employment at all
locations in the city. Employment in Z/total employment =a;total
vacancies/total employment =c.Thus the density of openings in this
job category equals cxD(k), where=ac. B and W are identical in all
respects except race: they possess the same amount and quality of
human capital and the same preferences, face the same employment
opportunities at the same wages (no employment discrimination
exists), have access to the same employment information systems,
share the same commuting and search cost functions, and have the
same permanent income. B experiences discrimination in the housing
market, however, while W does not. In this section, discrimination
takes an extreme form: B is unable to move from his6 initial location
while W is free to locate his residence in an optimal relation to any
job he accepts.7 Another, more realistic form of discrimination is
assumed: the costs to B associated with moving from the CBD are
high but noninfinite.
In the first instance, any nominal wage offer Y at a distance k1
will be worth more to W than to B in utility terms if a noncentrál
residence is optimal, because of the declining housing price function.
The difference in the value of Y(k1) to B and W can be approxi-
mated by comparing the "real wages" that this implies for each
worker, where the real wage equals the wage from the employer
minus housing expenditures, transportation costs, and moving ex-
penses (if relevant) for the worker's residential location if he accepts
the offer.
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and =realwages of BandW,respectively,for an offer of Y
atk1;
T(k1— =commutingcosts, which are some function of the
difference between the distances indicated within the
parentheses;
H=quantityof housing demanded at P(O);
M*=movingcosts discounted over the expected length of
employment; if M =totalmoving costs incurred in
period 0, M*isdefined by:
n+1M*
i=1
where p is the discount factor; and n, the expected
number of periods of employment;
0 =initialresidential distance from the CBD;
=distanceof employment from the CBD;
k2 =equilibriumresidential distance from the CBD for
jobs at k1k2, where T' =—P'(k2)H.
Sothat these real wages will represent at least monotonic trans-
formations of levels of utility for B and W, W's housing consumption
is held equal to B's. Otherwise, if housing demand were quite
price-elastic, W's housing expenditures might exceed B's (in spite of
the lower price facing W) causingto be less thaneven though
W's utility could be the higher. Analyzing W's behavior with the
implicit assumption of. a price elasticity of zero results in a lower
bound to the amount by which W's utility exceeds B's.
Thecosts of moving include the costs of finding a new home, any
psychological costs, and the actual expenses of packing, hiring a van,
etc. M* is taken as a constant, although costs probably do increase to
some extent with distance moved even within the metropolitan area.
The decision whether or not to move, given employment at k1, is
made by comparing the costs of living at the initial location with the
costs at k1 and k2. Thus W will choose to move if:
The circle of rad.
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(9-ib) P(O)H+T(k1 [P(k1)H+M*;P(k2)H+T(k2 —k1)+M*]
(9-2a)
The circle of radius k1suchthat at
P(O)H+T(k1_O)=min[P(k1)H+M*;P(k2)H+T(k2_k1)+M*]
(9-2b)
forms the boundary between the region in which employment could
be located and the worker would not benefit from moving either to
k1ork2(k1 inthe no-move region) and the area for which
moving wourd be beneficial (k1>k1 forthe move region). If the
no-move area is small, the worker wifl be considered very mobile. As
can be seen from Equation (9-2b), the tendency to move depends on
three factors. Ceteris paribus, if transportation costs are high, the
worker is more apt to move, and k1willbe small. If the housing
price function is very steep (i.e., the gradient is large), moving will be
beneficial more often than if the gradient is small. And clearly the
lower M*, the smaller is the worker's no-move region. In this
context, housing discrimination could be viewed as raising B's costs
of moving so high that nowhere in the metropolitan area would the
benefits of moving exceed the costs.
Assume that nominal wage offers in occupation Zateach
k1 (0k1k*), whereequals the distance from the CBD to the
edge of the city, are distributed according to the set of non-single-
valued functions [Y1k1 ]D.Suchdistributions can persist if, for
example, the cost of maintaining vacancies is higher for some firms
than for others; then the former would offer higher wages to raise
the probability of filling their openings more quickly. B and W are
aware of these densities and hence of the distribution of real wages
each faces in the city: and with F(yb) and the
respective cumulative distributions. Since the real value to B of any
nominal wage offer is less than or equal to the value to W, it may be
said that islarger than in the sense of first-degree
stochastic dominance (FSD) as defined in Hadar and Russell (1969,
p. 27):
(9-3)
for all y in the interval [0, L], where L is the maximum possible
wage offer. may be considered' to strictly dominate if
(9-3) holds and if for some y in [O,L], < F(yb). This will
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occurif for employment located at some k1 within the boundary of
the metropolitan area the inequality in Equation (9-2) holds and if it
is optimal for W to move outside the center of the city. Strict FSD
also implies strict second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), which
is defined as:
L L
f G(y)dy < fF(y)dy
q
for all lower bounds q in the interval [0, L] (from Hadar and Russell
1969). The domination of the distribution of real wage opportunities
facing W over that available to B will be used in determining the
relation between B's and W's expected wages.
Job search occurs as a random sample drawn from and
one draw is allotted per period, as if each worker went to the
employment service and was given one randomly selected firm to
check each day.8 The worker must decide whether to accept or
reject the offer in the same period in which it is made. (If no offer is
made, the search can be considered as having found a nominal wage
of zero.) It has been shown (McCall 1970, Nelson 1970, and Kohn
and Shavell 1974) that the optimal strategy, the one that maximizes
the present value of expected wealth, is to reject if the discounted
expected benefits of searching outweigh the costs of another search,
and to accept if the reverse is true. This produces a critical value
called the acceptance wage, or reservation wage: if the offer exceeds
Yb =realacceptance wage for B;
=realacceptance wage for W;
n=expectednumber of periods of employment;
pdiscount factor; and
S=costof the next search.
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the acceptance wage, accept it; if not, reject and search again (see
among others, McCall 1970, Rothschild 1973, and Mortensen 1970).
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Simplifying and integrating by parts:
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S = (Yb )dyb = (9-6)
PYW
Search costs include such factors as out-of-pocket costs of transpor-
tation to the job site; time costs of the trip and the interview, valued
at the minimum wage or whatever other value the worker places on
his leisure9; costs of information on potential vacancies; and the
psychological costs of any disutility the worker experiences in
searching such as discomfort in a job interview or uncertainty about
whether or not an offer will be forthcoming. For simplicity the costs
of one search, S, will be assumed to be the same for B and W and to
be constant in all periods and over all job locations. Clearly, more
plausible assumptions would be that search costs increase with the
distance between the job and the initial residential location and with
the length of time the worker has been unemployed.'°Realistically,
S also is higher for B than for W because, for example, the informal
information systems accessible to W are superior to those available to
B, since W is more likely to have friends and relatives who are
employed and whose employment is more dispersed throughout the
city.
Given the structure and assumptions outlined above, any differ-
ences in the search process undertaken by B compared to W would
be attributable only to discrimination in the housing market, pre-
venting B from changing his residential location.
PropositionA
If is strictly dominated by B's real acceptance wage
must be less than W's:<y.
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Again,since dominates the first term in (9-13) is
(99)
positive and f[1 —F(yb)] is nonnegative; so the equality can
hold. Thus; the assumption that the distribution of effective wages
for B is strictly dominated by the distribution for W implies that W's
effective acceptance wage will exceed B's.
(9-10)
PropositionB
Dependingon moving costs for W, in some range of k1, (0k1 <
k1) B's nominal acceptance wage will be less than W's, and for k1
greater thanwithin the city, the opposite will be true.
Proof: Let k be the distance at which moving becomes beneficial
for W. Let B's and W's nominal acceptance wages for employment at
9-11
any k1 be defined, respectively, as:
=3b +P(0)Jf+ T(k1 —0) (9.14a).
=+ min[P(0)H+T(k1—0); P(k1)H +M*;(9-14b)
P(k2)H+ T(k2 -_k1)+M*]
These represent the minimum wages that must be offered B and W,
such that they will not expect another search to make them better
off than if they accepted the current offer.
e, the equality in — — — —
In this region B and W incur the same housing and commuting
costs. Since throughout the city W's real acceptance wage exceeds
B's, here too will W's nominal asking wage be than B'sthe
amount that their real acceptance wages differ: I k1k1)—
Yb(klk1k1)
(9-12) — — —
Definingas that distance at which =(k1);
still exceeds(k1) but by less than —
kj<kl<k*:Y(kl)<Yb(kl)
=0 (9-13) B's nominal acceptance wage is than W's, meaning that B
will reject offers that W accepts (if k1 < k*).338 Invited Student Papers
An example of the pattern, described above is shown in Figure
9-1.''It implies that the average wage for employment near the
center of the city (specifically, within a radius ofwill be lower for
blacks than for whites. The opposite would be true at jobs beyond
k1—blacks who are employed there would expect to be paid more
than their white coworkers.
Superficially, this pattern might suggest that central-city firms
discriminate against blacks, while suburban firms act in their favor.
However, this result has been produced by explicitly excluding
employment discrimination; the outcome is due only to the con-
straint housing discrimination puts on blacks' residential location.
PropositionC
Housingdiscrimination has an indeterminate impact on the length
of unemployment, or duration of search, of B relative to W. Only if
the real wage distribution were more precisely specified could any
comparisons be made.
Proof: Since the probability that the next offer made will be
acceptable to B is [1 — and to W is [1 — the relative
sizeof and would indicate whether B had been
unemployed on average longer than W, or the opposite. Unfortunate-
ly, both F(5b) > and the reverse are consistent with the
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it canbeeither to the right or left of point D. Here, F6Tb)>
but the opposite is also possible.
(a) If housing discrimination in this model causes B to search
longer than W, > G(57) and Pr(b) =[1—F(5)] < [1 —
G(37)]=Pr(w); so — Equation
(9-9'S'may IDe rewritten as:




Housing Discrimination and Job Search 339
hown in Figure
yment near the







bly to the con-
location.
on the length



















by substituting into (9-15), then rearranging terms, we obtain more centralizec
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+ —1 F(yb)dyb =+f ment distributior
will have the s1
location.
from both sides leads to the, conclusion that <
which is simpiy a restatement of the initial assumption. Case III.For
The condition that dominates and the resultant move.
implication that < clearly are insufficient for determining Again, because
whether is greater or less than housing dis- those facing B,Housing Discrimination and Job Search 341
criminationappears to have no general predictable effect on the
relative length of search undertaken by Bcomparedto W.
(yw Proposition D
UnlessW is totally immobile residentially, B'semploymentwill be
more centralized than W's. we obtain
Proof:
Case I. Forany location of employment, Walwaysbenefits from
moving out of the center of the city.
ich islonger than Regardless of where he works, Wwillchoose to move from the
Ifinding center of the city, either to k2, or to k1 if k1 is greater than k2.
Since his real acceptance wage is independent of the location of
employment, the value to him of a given nominal wage rises
continually with distance from the CBD, and so his nominal n(9.9) becomes:
[
acceptancewage falls with distance. Because the reverse is true for B
(fora given nominal wage, CBD jobs are worth the most to him) and
his asking wage rises with distance, the relative probability of B's
becomingemployed at any location compared to W's probability is a
decreasing function of distance from the CBD, regardless of the
distribution of wage offers by firms. Thus, housing discrimination,
which prevents Bfrommoving, causes B'semploymentto be more
concentrated near the center of the city than it would otherwise be.
Since the amount by which W's real acceptance wage exceeds B's
is unknown, no comparison of their nominal asking wages averaged
for the whole city can be made.
Case II.Wneverchooses to move, regardless of the location of
employment.
In this instance the real opportunities available are identical for
both workers, and any housing discrimination that Bexperiencesis
irrelevant, since he, like W,wouldnot choose to leave the central city
even if he could. The nominal acceptance wages of both types of
workers will rise with distance from the CBD. Their actual employ-
ment distributions depend on the distribution of wage offers, but B
willhave the same probability as Wofaccepting a job at any
location.
CaseIlLFor some locations of potential employment, W will
the resultant move.
for determining Again, because the real opportunities available to W are superior to
Fhus, housing dis- those facing B,theformer's real acceptance wage will exceed the
I342 Invited Student Papers
latter's:> For employment in the center of the city and in
the restW's no-move zone, the housing and transportation costs
would be the same to both workers. Consequently, W's nominal
acceptance wage will exceed B's for any job in W's no-move region:
Yh(kl) for allk1 less than k.. Thus W is less apt than B to
become employed in this area, but if Wdoesaccept a job there, his
nominal wage will on the average be higher than B'satthe same
location.
On the other hand, in W's move area, his probability of accepting
employment is greater than B's (unless marginal transportation costs
are very small'2)•ThusB's employment will be more centralized
than W's, but B's expected wage for working in the central city
would be less than W's, while W's average wage near the edge of the
city would be higher than B's there. The residential mobility of W
determines the size of this no-move area and, thus, whether the
distribution of B's and W's employment is quite different or only
slightly so. The greater the number of firms for which W would find
moving beneficial, the more centralized will B's employment be
relative to W's.
From comparing B's employment and expected wage distributions
distance with W's under various conditions of mobility, it is
clear that unless W is as immobile without discrimination as B is with
it, the extreme form of discrimination considered here makes B's
employment more centralized and lowers his average nominal wage
near the CBD as well as reducing his real wage everywhere, but raises
his nominal wage farther out in the city. No conclusion can be
reached, however, on his expected nominal wage relative to W's over
the whole city without specifying the model more precisely.
MODIFIEDFORM OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Clearly,the assumption that housing discrimination totally prevents
blacks from moving out of the center city is not true: some blacks do
live in suburban areas, although their representation is much lower
than their income alone would warrant (Census 1973); and, more
relevant for the model under consideration, some blacks move from
the central ghetto to the suburban ring. Hence, a more reasonable
assumption about the form housing discrimination takes would be
then that blacks can move to suburban areas but that the move is
much more costly for them than for whites.'The additional costs
could result from the difficulties and unpleasantness of dealing with
white realtors; the refusal of some whites to sell or rentblacks,
forcing them to visit more housing units before finding an acceptable
one; or an uncej
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one; or an uncertain reception by white neighbors. Thus, housing
discrimination could impose high but noninfinite costs on blacks
who move out of the inner city:<Mb <00.
Inthis case, B calculates his optimal residential location in the
same way that W does. If a job is located beyond(the distance at
which B is indifferent between staying in the center city and
moving), he will move either to k2 or to k1, whichever is greater.
occurs where:
P(O)H + =min[P(k2)H÷ T(k2 —k—b)+
If<k2, B's optimal residential location for any job for which he
chooses to move will be the same as W's. It does not matter that Mb
exceeds since moving costs that are independent of distance
moved, as assumed not enter the calculation of k2. Only for
jobs located between andwill B and W have different
residential locations: W will choose to leave the central city while B
will not.
This fact results in some differences between the search processes
undertaken by B and W. Since the same nominal wage offers are
available to both workers, the real value of any offer to W will always
be equal to or than the value for B. At all locations beyond
the real wage for W will exceed Again the distribution of real
wage opportunities available to W, i.e., will dominate those
facing B, i.e., Therefore, as was shown in Proposition
—
Thenominal acceptance wage for W exceed at least
to by Between decreasing and
—Vb(k)-
+ (9-16)
Since the first term is positive and the second negative, the sign of
[Y (k)—(k)Jcanonly be determined if the terms of Equation
are known more precisely. Intuitively, if Mb is quite large, the
situation is similar to the case originally examined, where discrimina-
tion prevented B from moving at all and caused generally to
exceed(k) at points beyond Thus it seems probable that
I —.
Iexceeds and —Yb(k)]is negative
beyond(as is shown in Figure 9-3), but this cannot be proved as a
general rule.
As with the extreme version of housing discrimination, the relative
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minate.However, if it were truethat< for all k1 (as seems
unlikely),then B would to find an acceptable job
more quickly than W. If <forsome k1, the answer would
again depend on the specific distributions.
One definite conclusion, though, may be drawn concerning the
relative concentration of employment. Around the center of the city,
where Y (k)>(k), blacks have a higher probability of receiving
anacceptable offer than whites. Not only will blacks' employment
be more centralized, but their average wage (at least within the circle
of radius will be lower than the average for whites working in
the same area, again even in the absence of any racial discrimination
in the labor market.
SUMMARY
Theframework outlinedhereis an attempt to describe one mecha-
nism through which racial discrimination in the housing market
could affect the employment situation of blacks by constraining
their residential location. The conclusions are not surprising. Simply
because the type of discrimination postulated here limits residential
mobility, it induces blacks to follow a different job search pattern
than they would in the absence of housing discrimination.As would
have been expected, housing discrimination lowers the real income ofwage
inal acceptance wage
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blacksfrom what would have prevailed in the absence of constrained
residential location. This is true even in the suburbs, where discrim-
ination perhaps raises their average wage. It forces blacks to take
lower wages in the central city besides possibly concentrating their
employment there.
This is only part of the story, though. A general equilibrium
analysis include the response of firms, such as adjustments
through factor substitution and plant relocation, to the effects of
housing discrimination on the labor market behavior of blacks. The
land and housing price-distance functions would also be expected to
shift. As long as P(k) had a negative but increasing slope, the
conclusions in this study would remain valid.It might become
possible, however, to draw broader implications such as the effects
on white workers, firms, relative housing prices, and the level and
efficiency of production.
NOTESTO CHAPTER NINE
1.Criticism on methodology comes from Saks-Offner (1971) and Masters
(1974); on central-city labor demand, from Noll (1970), Fremon (1970), and
Lewis (1969); on aggregate demand conditions from Mooney (1969); and on
employment discrimination, from Harrison (1974).
2. See von Furstenberg et a!. (1974, pt. 2) for a good summary of the
literature.
3. "City" as used here is synonymous with SMSA (Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area) or metropolitan or urbanized area concepts, not simply the
region legally known as a city. "Center of the city" means the central business
district (CBD), and central city or center city and suburbs are used loosely to
refer to areas near the center and near the edge of the city, respectively.
4. If wages vary systematically with distance, rents and employment density
may not decline with distance. It is necessary to make the additional assumption
that either the value of a central location is large enough, or the capital-labor
ratio at all distances is high enough for variations in the land rental bill to
overshadow variations in the wage bill.
5. At k2, a(transportationcosts)/ak =—a (housingcosts)fak.
6. All workers will be referred to as males to simplify the references,
although• the analysis is applicable to a work force of both sexes.
7. B could be allowed to move within a specified area around the CBD
defined as the ghetto, but this would only produce the same results with a more
complex analysis.
8. It would be preferable to allow a worker to search first those potential
jobs that would afford him the highest utility—far B, CBD jobs, then those next
to the CBD, etc.; and for W, jobs at the edge of the city. Salop's model (1973)
includes a similar optimal search order, in' which the firms with the highest
expected wage offersare searchedfirst.However, the costs in terms of
complexity seem to outweigh the benefits of more realism.346 Invited Student Papers
9. A more desirable though more complicated measure of opportunity cost M. and
would be the current wage offer, as in Salop (1973), since this more accurately Economic
reflects the income foregone if the worker searches again. Lewis, Wilfred
10. If search costs are allowed to increase with the length of search, the Some New Data."I acceptance wage will be lower the greater the duration of search. As the MasteLS, Stanley
reservation wage drops, if it falls so low that the value of welfare payments or Employment, and
other non-labor.market activities exceeds it, the worker will leave the labor force nomics, August.
and join the ranks of the discouraged workers. McCall, J.J. 197
11. There are two instances in which the pattern in Figure 9.1 does not hold: Journal of
(1) If the parameters are such that at no employment location does W choose to Mills, Edwin S. 1
move out of the center of the city, P(0)H +T(k*—0)<P(k*)H +M*This is Mooney, Josepi
essentially the situation for B, whose "moving costs" effectively prohibit him Metropolitan Decen
from leaving the ghetto. This seems highly unlikely, given that a much greater Mortenson, Dale
fraction of workers employed in the ring of SMSAs live in the ring rather than the Phillips Curve."
living in the central city and commuting out. Nelson, Phillip.
(2) A less extreme version of this condition would be that only at a very PoliticalEconomy,]
distantk1 would Wdecideto move, and that the falling would not have Noll, Roger.
intersected the rising by k*Sincethe difference between B's and W's and the Conditions
searches arises from B's inability to move outside the ghetto and since the most Metropolis: Public J
likely state of the world includes frequent benefits for W from moving, these Beverly Hills, Calif.:
two extreme conditions will be ignored. Rothschild, Mich
12. Very low marginal transportation costs could prevent B's nominal Information: A Surv
acceptance wage from ever equaling W's at any distance by causing Yb(kl) Daniel, an
and to be so flat that even at k1 > k1, where aYb(kl)/akl > 0 Segregation, Negro I
and < 0, the two curves might never intersect at k1k*. Journal of Economk
13. Price discrimination is another form which housing discrimination might Salop, S. 1973.
take. Unfortunately, little could be concluded about its effect on black Economic Studies, A
employment opportunities. The real acceptance wage for W would exceed that von Furstenberg,
for B because of stochastic dominance. Beyond that, little else can even be tion. Volume I: Hou
considered probable: whether Yb(kl) is greater or less than at any
location is uncertain and, therefore, so are relative concentrations of employ-
ment by race. The comparative lengths of search are again totally indeterminate.
Consequently, there seems to be little point to a more complete analysis of the
effects of price discrimination.
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